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The Cost of Doing Business Abroad and
International Capital Market Equilibrium
1.0 Introduction
This paper examines the implications of the costs of doing business in foreign
countries for the resulting capital market equilibrium.  When transferring capital goods
across national boundaries is costly we indicate that the costs incurred are quasi-fixed
in a one-good, two-country, intertemporal model with complete financial markets.  In
our model of the international capital market, deviations from purchasing power parity
(PPP) are endogenously generated.  The relative price of physical resources located in
one country compared to resources located in another is called the "real exchange rate."
The outcome of the model-based analysis is an endogenous generation of a mean-
reverting, real exchange rate in a continuous-time, general equilibrium model of the
international capital market.  In dynamic equilibrium, the transfer of capital goods
between the two countries is found to be infrequent and lumpy in nature as is observed
in foreign direct investment.
Recently, Evans and Lothian (1993) have developed an empirical model to
uncover the sources of fluctuations in the real dollar exchange rates of major industrial
countries.  They find that the real exchange rates did not evolve simply in response to
permanent shocks.  Transitory shocks played a relatively small but statistically
significant role.  Earlier, Huizinga (1987) documented mean-reversion of commodity
prices to their long-run equilibrium value.  This implies negative serial correlation in
exchange rates in the longer run in contrast to the serially correlated changes implied
by a random walk.  Our theoretical model for the real exchange rate is consistent with
these empirical findings.  As the data indicate, the real exchange rate in our model is
influenced by the presence of both temporary and permanent components.  Earlier2
empirical results in Officer (1976), Lee (1976), King (1977), and Cornell (1979) are also
reinforced by the analysis in this paper.
The real exchange rate in our model moves within a band between upper and
lower barriers, as in a target zone, or like EMS exchange rates.  The movement of
capital goods occurs when the real exchange rate is reflected back within the band by
the upper or lower barrier.  With quasi-fixed costs for capital stock transfer, there is
mean-reversion in the real exchange rate.  Recent empirical studies indicating  a
significant mean-reversion component in the long-run behavior of real exchange rates
by Koedijk and Schotman (1990) as well as Glen (1992), mean-reversion in real
exchange rates using modified Dickey-Fuller tests by Cheung and Lai (1994), and mean
reversion in EMS exchange rates by Svensson (1991) and Mizrach (1993) validate our
theoretical results.
Increasingly, firms are engaged in manufacturing activities located in different
countries.  This network of activities operating for the multinational corporation
derives value because of the ease of transfer of capital goods for shifting production
between one country and another.  The cost of transferring capital goods for foreign
direct investment is but one component of the overall cost of doing business abroad.
The entrenchment of incumbents in the foreign market and other barriers to foreign
direct investment result in a cost structure different from the one for merely
reallocating capital in a domestic situation.  As Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994) point out, it
is costly to switch production from one country to another due to costs associated with
shutdowns and startups, labor contracting and managerial time commitments.
Entrenchment of incumbents in foreign markets raises barriers to foreign direct
investment because an incumbent has lower distribution costs than an entrant as
suggested by Farrell and Shapiro's (1988) switching cost model.
We take one step further in this paper by observing that while technology
spillover is quite common between such multinational firms, the competitive advantage3
of incumbents in foreign markets due to lower distribution costs does not spillover to
other firms.  As Stein (1994) observes in a model of repeated innovation, there are no
spillovers with distribution costs and incumbent firms' existing customer bases give
them a competitive advantage over would-be entrants.  In the case of transfer of capital
goods, extending this idea to the international context, we find that to generate any
returns on the capital, multinationals entering these foreign markets would need to
incur costs proportional to the amount of such entrenched capital stock in the foreign
market.  The international capital market equilibrium we analyze does not explicitly
include the modeling of a distribution sector but the costs of operating abroad emerge
from such barriers to foreign direct investment.
The international capital market has been modeled in recent times using both
partial equilibrium and general equilibrium approaches.  International capital asset
pricing models obtained by putting together the first-order conditions of portfolio
choice for various investors of the world or using the small country assumption are
good examples of the partial equilibrium approach.  The general equilibrium approach
requires a full specification of the exogenous variables and their stochastic processes
where all endogenous variables can be analyzed.  Earlier general equilibrium models of
the international capital market like Stockman and Tesar (1990), Backus and Smith
(1993) and Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1994) involved the use of nontraded goods to
explain terms of trade and investors' portfolio choice.  As a class, general equilibrium
models do improve on partial equilibrium approaches by offering more testable results
for empirical research.
However, the general equilibrium models mentioned above have proved
inadequate in some ways.  These models could generate movements in the terms of
trade but could not fully explain the high volatility of the terms of trade.  Secondly,
they could not explain the small unconditional correlation in consumption across
countries as well as its relatively small size compared to the correlation in output.4
Thus, more recently, these models have given way to an approach which introduces
frictions in the specification of production sets.  When physical movement of goods in
international markets takes place these models include a transfer cost.  This cost
provides the needed degree of freedom for variation in the terms of trade.  For
convenience, these models have usually assumed such transfer costs to be proportional
to the amount of physical resources being transferred (see, for example, Dumas 1992,
Baxter and Crucini 1991, and Uppal 1993).  As we discussed above, however, the
overall transfer cost can no longer be captured by the simplistic assumption of
proportional costs1 when applied to the movement of capital goods across countries for
direct foreign investment.  Besides, such proportional costs lead to infrequent
movement of physical resources in infinitesimal amounts on each such occasion.  This
seems contrary to the large, lumpy transfer of capital goods observed in international
trade.  Our results are consistent with this observation.
The assumption that transfer costs are proportional to the capital stock in the
foreign market emerges from the distribution cost advantage of incumbents with
existing customer bases.  Such customer bases lead to two important consequences: (a)
they could reduce the long-run average level of innovation represented by new capital
inflows, and (b) they lead to endogenous bunching, or waves, in innovative activity.
Our findings (in the international extension) are consistent with such conclusions
drawn very early by Schumpeter (1936) and recently researched by Stein (1994): first,
we find that finite, lumpy capital transfers indeed take place infrequently and that the
higher the transfer cost, lower are such capital transfers; second, we find the wave-like
aspect of innovation manifested in the foreign direct investment context as the positive
autocorrelatedness of capital stock transfers in the shorter run, which implies that if
                                               
1Hollifield and Uppal (1995) derive the reduced-form relation between the forward premium and the
change in the spot exchange rate in the presence of deviations from purchasing power parity in the
proportional cost-based model by Dumas (1992) and find that when using an instrument set containing
both nominal and real returns, the model is rejected by the monthly data.5
there is an innovation today, the odds of another innovation tomorrow may be
substantially higher.
The incentive for capital goods flow between countries is provided by the
opportunity to invest in either location and the need to hedge against consumption
shortfalls in one's own country. Though the one good in the two countries in our model
is identical, random uncorrelated output shocks in the two countries provide the
motivation for transfer of this capital good in spite of its being costly.  Firms will be
willing to invest capital abroad only if such costs can be traded off against
commensurate benefits from going multinational via direct foreign investment.  Indeed,
the internalization theory posits that direct foreign investment occurs when a firm can
increase its value by internalizing markets for certain of its intangible assets.  These
intangible assets such as marketing abilities, managerial skills, or consumer goodwill
have characteristics of public goods in that their value is enhanced in direct proportion
to the scale of the firm's markets.  Morck and Yeung (1991) find that investors value
multinationality for such intangible assets which justify direct foreign investment.  In
our simple two-country setup, we posit the portfolio diversification motive2 rather than
internalization gains as the benefit.  In equilibrium, firms will be willing to transfer
capital abroad when the incremental costs equal incremental benefits at the margin.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.0 the model is set up and
an approach for solving it is outlined. Section 3.0 presents the solution which includes
the process for the movement of goods from one country to another and the process for
deviations from the Law of One Price (LOP). Section 4.0 includes an interpretation of
the results for real exchange rates. Section 5.0 concludes the paper and suggests ideas
for future research.
                                               
2See Adler and Dumas (1983).6
2.0 The Model
We work with a simple world economy made up of two countries, home and
foreign, each having a single, representative investor.  Each representative is restricted
to consuming only the domestically available physical good.  The home and foreign
representative investors are otherwise identical: they begin life with equal
endowments, have isoelastic utility functions with the same degree of risk-aversion,
and have the same rate of impatience.
The model is based on the costly transfer of storable goods from one country to
another.  The storable good is identified by its location, but is perfectly substitutable
across the two countries for both consumption and production.  The alternative to such
transfer is consumption in the country of origin or reinvestment in a single, risky
constant-returns-to-scale production process.  The production processes are identical
across the two countries in their instantaneous expected rates of return and
instantaneous standard deviations of the rate of return.  However, the output shocks3 in
the two countries are uncorrelated.  Consumption of the good is location-specific but it
is possible for the consumer-investor to own goods in both countries. The good is
identified by its location.
The initial endowments of the consumer-investors imply symmetric treatment:  in
order to diversify their portfolio (i.e. provide a hedge against the risk of being subjected
to adverse output shocks), the consumer-investors would move to equate the stocks of
goods in the two countries. However, since transferring the good from one country to
another (which is tantamount to building and dismantling capital) is costly and, in
particular, involves "quasi-fixed" costs, the consumer-investors will "wait and see"
before moving the good across national boundaries.  The fixed cost of investing (or
shipping capital goods) abroad would encourage lumpy investment since the cost of
investment is independent of the size of investment.  However, such investment abroad
                                               
3These could be, for example, productivity shocks as in real business cycle models.7
will not take place unless the returns (with commensurate diversification of risk) from
such investment exceed the fixed cost incurred.  In the interim, when there is no foreign
investment, there will be deviations from parity in capital stocks across the two
countries.  In such cases, the representative consumer-investors in the two countries
would optimally rebalance their portfolios by consuming at different rates.  This
implies that consumers in the land of abundance, for example, will consume more
rather than investing the good abroad as an immediate response.  In this "region of
tolerance" they prefer to increase their consumption rates rather than transferring the
good to the foreign country.  At such times, the relative price of the domestic
consumption good with respect to the foreign consumption good will differ from one:
usual consumption sharing rules which apply in integrated goods markets will not
apply.  Individual consumption will be a function not just of aggregate consumption
but also of the allocation of physical assets between the two countries.
Following in the tradition of Lucas and Prescott (1971) and Constantinides (1982),
the international capital market equilibrium in this paper can be arrived at via a short-
cut where a Pareto-optimal consumption allocation  that can be achieved by the
consumer-investors is studied. The transfer of the good between the two countries
being costly causes the Pareto optimum to be constrained.  Under these conditions the
equilibrium in the goods-market and capital-market can be replaced by an appropriate
central planning problem.
2.1 The optimization problem
Let us assume that all consumers start their lives with endowments of goods in
amounts such that the appropriate central welfare function devotes equal weights to the
utility levels of the households of the two countries.  These weights are constant over
time and across states of nature only in a Pareto-optimal market. However, equal
weights do not imply identical endowments. Since an individual consumer is endowed15
varying degrees of risk aversion (see Figure 2) and varying levels of uncertainty. This is
achieved by the use of a numerical technique: starting with a trial value for l and using
the boundary conditions at the extreme point w = 1n l, get the values of I'(w) and I"(w).
With these as the initial conditions, the partial differential equation (1.24) can be
continued12 until the central point.  To do so, the numerical approximation procedure
used is the Runge Kutta method of order four.13  If the chosen trial value for l satisfies
the condition I'(0) = 0 at w = 0 (by symmetry), it is appropriate and the solution reached.
Otherwise a new trial value is chosen and the process is repeated.
The behavior of w (the allocation of the goods between the two countries) inside the
cone is the result of production shocks and differential consumption rates, and can be
obtained easily from the knowledge of the value function (see Appendix A).  It is
obvious from equation (A.1) in Appendix A that the behavior of w is captured entirely
by its drift since the diffusion coefficient is constant.  The drift gives the conditional
expected change in w.  The drift as a function of w is plotted in Figure 3.  Two
noteworthy features of the drift are its nonlinearity and tendency for polar attraction.
This tendency pulls the w process towards the edges of the cone.  In the figure, this
"centrifugal tendency" indicates that the process flies off the center of the cone.14   The
process is non-linear and autoregressive of order 1.
3.2 The dynamics of prices and LOP deviations
The main purpose of determining the value function V(K, K*) was to infer the prices
which would prevail in a decentralized market economy by looking at the first
derivatives of the value function V(K, K*).  Now, one can infer prices which would
                                               
12This is done by transforming the partial differential equation (1.24) into an ordinary differential
equation in I(w).
13See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972).
14The tendency for polar attraction or 'centrifugal tendency' in the w process is because consumption
rates rebalance the stocks of capital, but less than proportionally.19
diversify away risk. On the other hand, given a certain level of risk aversion, the size of
the cone of no shipping increases with increasing levels of fixed transaction costs. Since
the fixed cost of shipping is higher than before, the consumer-investor would now
prefer rebalancing through consumption changes rather than shipping the good to the
other country.
The processes for movement of physical capital and LOP deviations behave in this
fashion due to the underlying consumption and shipping patterns of the consumer-
investors in the two countries. This economic rationale is the main thrust of these
numerical results. For example, the centrifugal tendency of the w process follows from a
basic principle: if there were no net capital investment between the two countries, given
isoelastic utility functions, consumption in each country would be strictly proportional
to the local stock of capital. When investment of capital goods as observed in this model
is allowed, both domestic and foreign consumers have a claim on any increased stock
of capital. Foreigners consume more out of their own capital immediately but collect
their claim on foreign capital in the next shipment. In the meantime, the local
accumulation of goods, as well as the increased foreign consumption, marginally
contribute to making the next shipment more imminent. The w process is stationary
because the regular boundaries keep the centrifugal tendency in check. The physical
process w underlies the process for the LOP deviation. At any point in the open region
within the cone, the conditional probability of an outward movement is greater than
that of an inward movement, like the physical process w.
5.0  Conclusions and Future Research
The motivation for this paper was provided by the fact that entry costs for firms
developing new markets abroad are, in part, fixed costs.  Unlike earlier models by Dixit
(1989a, 1989b), which were driven by an exchange rate process, the model here is more20
fundamentally driven by random output shocks in two countries and we obtain the real
exchange rate process endogenously.  However, as discussed in the previous section,
there are some significant differences in the behavior of the price and LOP deviation
process. These differences are a consequence of the boundary behavior which depends
on whether the cost of capital investment is fixed or variable.
When such capital transfer costs are a concave function (e.g., when there is a fixed
and a variable cost component), two barriers are needed--a barrier triggering action
and a barrier one moves to--similar to an [s, S] policy. At the outer boundary or barrier,
the regulator would be of finite size (as in this paper) and at the inner boundary or
barrier the regulator would be an infinitesimal one like the proportional or variable
costs case. Starting out with fixed transaction costs is the first step in implementing
such a complete model for entry costs.  It paves the way for future research on entry
costs which are made up of both fixed and variable cost components. In order to build a
reputation, firms may spend in the hope that any doubts about their long-term
objectives for market development are laid to rest.
5.1 Empirical implications
Models of entry costs, such as this one or Dumas (1992), with fixed or proportional
cost structures respectively, find that when capital transfer is costly, relative deviations
from LOP will exist and, more importantly, that such deviations are characterized by
both mean reversion and conditional heteroskedasticity. Are purchasing power parity
(PPP) deviations the result of fixed and variable entry costs or the consequence of the
presence of either one of them?  This issue needs to be addressed in future research.
Simulated data from such models of deviations from PPP and mean-reversion, when
put to the test with real exchange rate data, will give us the answer to this question.
Secondly, the twin issues of non-linearity and heteroskedasticity need some
empirical investigation.  Tests for non-linearity proposed by Keenan (1983), Tsay21
(1986) and Hsieh (1989) are examples.  Hsieh (1989) has found that a GARCH (1,1)
model fits the daily nominal exchange rate data fairly well.  Establishing a relationship
between such discrete time ARCH/GARCH models and the continuous-time model
proposed in this paper is another important avenue for future theoretical and empirical
research.23
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